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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The state's argument that the district court's holding is supported by substantial evidence
is not supported by the relevant case law. A close comparison of the facts in this case and the
facts in the relevant case law reveal that there is no proximate cause between the crime to which
Scruggs pleaded guilty, and the injury to Deputy Germann's knee.
ARGUMENT

In its brief the state relies State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387,271 P.3d 1243 (Ct. App.
2012), to support its conclusion that Scruggs should be held accountable for restitution. The state
makes note of the "exceptionally similar" facts of Cottrel to this case. (Respondent's Brief p.
10). However the state's reliance on Cottrell to argue there is proximate cause between Scrugg's
actions and the injuries in this case is misplaced. While the injuries to the officers in both case
are similar, Cottrell in its totality is dissimilar from the case at hand.
The state argues that the distinction between this case and Cottrell is nothing more than
Scrugg's statement of his conclusion. However, the presence of proximate cause in Cottrell
illuminates the lack of proximate cause in Scrugg's case. In order for a defendant to be held
liable for restitution to the victim of a crime, there must be a causal nexus between the criminal
conduct and the injury. State v. Eddins, 156 Idaho 645,650,330 P.3d 391,396 (2014). For such
a nexus to exist, the criminal actions must be both the actual cause and the proximate cause of
the victim's injury. Id. "Proximate cause focuses on the foreseeability of the injury ...." Id.
However if an injury is "so highly unusual" that the Court could find "as a matter of law that a
reasonable [person], making an inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might
produce, would not have reasonably expected the injury to occur," then there is no proximitae
cause between said action and injury. Id.
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In the case at hand Scruggs approached Germann and slapped the taser from Germann's
hand. Germann then turned Scruggs around to attempt to gain control of Scruggs and effectuate
an arrest. Scruggs continued to pull away at this point, and Germann then suffered a patellar
dislocation in his left knee. The state argues that Germann's action of attempting to gain control
of Scruggs was a reasonably foreseeable reaction to Scrugg's actions (Respondent's brief, p. 13).
However Germann,s knee injury is not a reasonably foreseeable result of Scruggs slapping a
taser from Germann's hand. This is the precise distinction between this case and Cottrell. In
Cottrell, actions of resisting an officer resulting in an officer having to tackle Cottrell to the

ground in order to gain control of him do have a reasonable foreseeability of knee, as well as
other injuries. However in this case a knee injury resulting from Scruggs' battery- when the
battery is slapping a taser from the officer's hand - is a result that is "so highly unusual', that "a
reasonable [person], making an inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might
produce, would not have reasonably expected the injury to occur." Eddins, at 650, 396. No
reasonable person would conclude that slapping a taser form one's hand would result in a knee
injury.
In Cottrell the court concluded that it is reasonably forseeable that resisting arrest could
lead to a struggle which could lead to injury to the officer. Cottrell at 393, 1249. The difference
between Cottrell and this case is that while it is reasonably foreseeable that resisting arrest may
lead to a struggle and injury, it is not reasonably foreseeable that slapping the taser from
Germann's hand would lead to an injury of Germann's knee. The state is correct that Scruggs is
eager to distinguish Cottrell from this case. Further, the state is correct that Cottrell is factually
similar to this case. However it is those similar facts that illustrate the lack of proximate cause in
this case. When taking into account what was reasonably foreseeable in Cottrell, and squaring
those facts with this case, injury to Germann's knee was not a reasonable foreseeability of
2

Scrugg's act of slapping the taser from Germann's hand. In fact, when considering Scrugg's
actions with Germann's injury, that injury is unusual that "a reasonable person would not have
expected the injury to occur." Id, at 650, 396. Because such an injury was not reasonably
foreseeable, there is no proximate cause between Scrugg's actions and Germann's injury.
Without such proximate cause, Scruggs cannot be held liable for restitution in this case.
Further, the State's reliance on State v. Eddins, 156 Idaho 645,330 P.3d 391 (Ct. App.
2014) to distinguish this case from the holding in State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 161 P.3d 689
(Ct. App. 2007) is also misplaced. In Eddins the defendant was held liable for restitution of
medical bills from acid being spilled on the victim's face. Eddins was acquitted of aggravated
battery by a jury, but convicted to the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Eddins at
647. Whether the lesser included offense was based on the statutory or the pleading theory is not
clear from the opinion, but it is well settled law that a conviction for a lesser included offense
requires the state to prove the elements of that lesser included offense. The Court upheld the
restitution order in Eddins because there was proximate cause, and thus a causal connection
between Eddins' crime and the victim's injuries. The Court ultimately found that the acid bums
in the Eddins case was a reasonable foreseeability of the lesser included offense of aggravated
assault, which was Eddins threatening the victim with acid.
Unlike Eddins, in Shafer as well as this case, the actions resulting in injury were separate
and distinct from the crimes to which the respective defendants pleaded guilty. In the case at
hand the injury to the officer's knee occurred after the commission of the battery on an officer
had ended. That battery was Scruggs' act of slapping the taser out of Germann' s hand. As
discussed above, a patellar dislocation in Germann's left knee is not a reasonable foreseeability
of Scruggs slapping a taser out of Germann' s hand.
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CONCLUSION
The appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's order on
restitution because there is not proximate cause between the injury and the crime to which
Scruggs pleaded guilty.

DATED this 19th day of March, 2019.

Gooding County Assistant Public Defender
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